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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**SPLIT PERSONALITY: ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY IN REINFORCING U.S. MILITARY
“JOINTNESS”**

by

Christopher L. Larrabee

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

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
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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.


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ABSTRACT

America's experience in the Second World War was to fundamentally transform how it would understand, prepare for, and prosecute war in the future, stemming from a remarkable conjoining of intellectualism, innovation, scale of production, and commitment of manpower not witnessed in any earlier conflict. The integrated joint nature of major combat operations figured prominently in this transformation, and the National Defense Act of 1947 sought to institutionalize such "jointness" through legislation as a permanent characteristic of the American military establishment. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986 was in large measure a response of continued inter-service organizational inefficiencies which culminated in a series of fatal and embarrassing military fiascos. Many saw Goldwater-Nichols as the logical and necessary next step in a transformative process begun in 1947; others see willful resistance to joint reform on the part of the military services, undermining both the spirit and the letter of the law. This thesis seeks to uncover insights about the nature of the services and joint force through the application of organizational identity theory. Identity theory offers the potential not only for understanding, but for shaping the identity relationship between the services and joint force so that improved joint organizational efficiency will result in greater joint force effectiveness.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the American Fighting Man, who—irrespective of the hardships he faces—is ever guided by American ideals and identity, and has never hesitated to leap into the breach of danger in the defense of his country and comrades.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The nature of America's early wars was such that the naval and land forces operated for the most part autonomously within their spheres of technical and professional expertise, with the military situation occasionally compelling closer cooperation at the tactical and operational level. The urgency of the situation normally determined the degree of cooperation, and while effectiveness may have suffered from other sources of friction, the lack of desire for military success through a combining of efforts typically was not one of them. There was no permanent arrangement for such inter-service cooperation, and once the need had passed it was back to business as usual.

The changing nature of warfare as well as of American security requirements by the turn of the 20th Century compelled reexamination of how the United States should posture its military forces for war. The effects of economic globalization and the rise of peer competitors able to challenge Britain's absolute command of the sea meant that the vast ocean expanses and Royal Navy's effectual support of U.S. interests were no longer sufficient to ensure the viability of the Monroe Doctrine, still the principal expression of American strategic security interests. The Spanish-American War forced the sober realization on the United States that it must do more in providing for its own security, marking a transition from a Western Hemispheric to a global appreciation of American defense needs. This transition was accompanied by dramatic changes in the means of warfare—innovations that improved the speed of communications—and thus, of national decision making; increased the scale and rapidity of mobilization for war; saw the increase in weapon lethality; and witnessed huge leaps in the mechanization of warfare. Not only was an essentially historically tactical focus on thinking about war consigned to

obsolescence, but the increasing pace and scope of warfare at the operational and strategic levels was foreign to American experience, encouraging examination of joint preparation and planning for war. Two world wars did nothing if not cement this consideration as a critical criterion of wartime success.

America's experience in the Second World War fundamentally transformed how it would understand, prepare for, and prosecute war in the future, stemming from a remarkable conjoining of intellectualism, innovation, scale of production, and commitment of manpower not witnessed in any earlier conflict. While American capacity for rapid and total mobilization clearly was a crucial factor in determining ultimate Allied victory, wartime success also was strongly colored by President Roosevelt's establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the integrated, joint collaboration of American arms.¹ Recognizing that the scale and speed of future warfare might not again afford the U.S. military the luxury of redefining how it would organize to fight while on the cusp of crisis, President Truman, through the National Defense Act of 1947, sought to establish joint operating capability as a permanent characteristic of the U.S. military establishment.²

¹ Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 109-110; R. Elberton Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1985), 706, 717. The 1920 National Defense Act charged the Army with conducting economic and industrial mobilization planning as part of its general war planning, and this mobilization planning was a significant factor in preparing the United States for WWII.

² Zegart, 117. Congress largely deferred to the President's recommendations for JCS organization and authorities, and preferred to avoid the political firestorm attached to becoming embroiled in interservice rivalry.

The Problem

Resistance by the military services, especially the Navy, to such sweeping and fundamental organizational change as desired by President Truman had the effect of diluting the final language of the Act, in fact preserving much of the existing service authority at the expense of the JCS and new Secretary of Defense.³ This resistance to perceived Congressional interference in military matters, while consistent with the historical record of civil-military relations in the United States, emerged as a prominent characteristic of the American military establishment in the postwar period, as it experienced dramatic and permanent enlargement.⁴ Joint operations were fine so long as a joint military organization did not threaten primacy over individual service organizations, missions, and resources. This resistance has not prevented the military services from conducting joint operations, but history demonstrates that it does undermine to some degree the ability of U.S. forces to function effectively together when unity of command and interoperability are affected.⁵ Explanations of this resistance frequently are found in the bureaucratic nature, culture, traditions, and parochialism of the military services—all certainly were in ample evidence in the legislative debate

³ Zegart, 109-126.

⁴ Richard K. Betts, “Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?,” in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 12-16. Betts observes that the nature of the postwar threat to the United States changed the dynamic of civil-military relations, transitioning from one consistent with American democratic values to one that best provides for American security. This necessity to increase trust and reliance on military judgement inevitably results in attempts to maintain civilian oversight—“interference”.

⁵ *Operation Anaconda*, the first significant employment of U.S. ground forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in March 2002, serves as illustration. In spite of all the advances made in the area of joint operations since 1986, *Anaconda* witnessed gross examples of the lack of unity of command, intelligence sharing, and service interoperability that Goldwater-Nichols sought to eliminate. See Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (New York: Penguin Group (USA), 2005).

leading up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, now generally accepted as landmark legislation in the area of defense reform.⁶

Critics continue to fault the military services for their resistance to fully accept the spirit—and sometimes the letter—of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.⁷

Bureaucracy, culture, tradition, and even parochialism are not necessarily bad traits for an organization to espouse, but in the context of the present discussion they have become obstacles on the path to improving joint military organizational efficiency as a means of promoting overall American military effectiveness—or have they? The basis for such strident service parochialism seems to demand closer analysis. Much of the service consternation over the Goldwater-Nichols legislation can be characterized as friction caused by service separatism, each service's overemphasis of its unique and essential role in national defense.⁸ Since such service separatism finds expression in differing joint and service organizational structures, organizational priorities, and organizational approaches to conducting business, it seems a fruitful endeavor to consider more closely the organizational nature of the military services.

The concept of organizational identity presents one such lens for scrutiny. Modern study of organizational identity gained firm footing with the publication of Albert and Whetten's research in 1985. American industry at this time was in the throes of struggling to understand how and why it was losing market share and profits to foreign competitors; perhaps coincidentally, the debate over Goldwater-Nichols reached its most

⁶ James R. Locher III, "Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," in *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 103, 108-109, 111.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 109-112.

⁸ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 31-32.

heated point at the same time, as the Department of Defense (DoD) attempted to reconcile its own recent performance record.⁹ The DoD, like American industry, was grappling with the questions of why, how, where—and if—it needed to fundamentally reform itself in order to improve organizational efficiency and effectiveness—and improve the chances for organizational success. Albert and Whetten defined organizational identity as those characteristics that are most important, central, and enduring in an organization, and thereby calculated to guide organizational priorities and actions. This combination of characteristics is shown to be linked to how organizations and organizational leaders interpret issues, understand problems, identify threats, perceive and resolve conflict, and determine strategies for developing comparative advantage. Organizational identity theory maintains that identity is a powerful determinant of organizational success or failure.¹⁰

Through systematic consideration of military organizational traits it may be possible to divine an underlying characteristic that ultimately influences organizational efficiency—or inefficiency. This characteristic is the expression of the identity of the organization—what the organization believes of itself and would have others believe. The application of organizational identity theory may reveal the military service traits to be symptomatic of a more systemic explanation, one firmly rooted in organizational

⁹ David C. Jones, “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 144-149. General Jones, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was troubled by what he saw as systemic and chronic flaws in American military ability to effectively operate jointly. With the publication of his views, he effectively “came out of the closet”, incurring the wrath of many of his peers.

¹⁰ Peter Foreman and David Whetten, “Members’ Identification with Multiple-Identity Organizations”, *Organization Science* 13 (November-December 2002): 618; Stuart Albert and David Whetten, “Organizational identity,” *Research in Organizational Behavior* 7 (1985).

identity, of why a truly unified joint military structure, to the extent originally envisioned in 1947 and by subsequent reformers, remains elusive.¹¹

As it reduces its military capability in real terms, with no apparent lessening of actual and potential threats to U.S. interests, the United States must seek to maximize the efficiency with which it employs available military means. A key source of efficiency—yielding benefits in terms of better mission effects, reduced time and resource requirements, and increased interoperability—lies in improving the ability of the military services to function jointly.¹² Through understanding the dynamics of service identity and exploring the basis for a joint force identity, it may be possible to manipulate the elements of identity in order to improve aggregate U.S. military capability. The sense of joint force identity—“jointness”—should be strengthened relative to military service identities in order to increase the overall systemic effectiveness of the US military.

The Approach

Superimposing a theoretical framework of organizational identity on the joint military environment will demonstrate that a concept of joint identity exists in competition with service identities, and identify how the concept of joint identity can be reinforced. Beginning with a review of organizational identity theory in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will construct the environment in which the services and joint force exist.

¹¹ Zegart, 110, 117. Congress, the services, and the president began debating postwar JCS organization in 1944. Initial proposals called for JCS control of the military budget, a single military commander with operational authority over all U.S. armed forces, and JCS decision making based on majority, vice unanimous, vote. Truman believed such a JCS structure would result in better strategy and military advice, improve operational effectiveness, and yield economic savings.

¹² Again, Operation Anaconda serves to illustrate this point. While an overwhelming military success, with over 200 Taliban fighters killed and marking the end of the initial stage of operations in Afghanistan, *Anaconda* nevertheless was wasteful of time and resources—and of lives, if these losses reasonably could have been avoided.

Chapter 4 will then examine the military services and joint force through a theoretical lens, developing a working understanding of military identity. Analysis of the environment will illustrate the hybrid organizational identity of the military services as both separate services and as part of the larger joint force. Chapter 5 will propose recommendations for strengthening the concept of joint force identity as a means of reinforcing overall joint military efficiency that in turn lead to greater joint military effectiveness. Chapter 6 will summarize the thesis's argument and recommendations, and will indicate useful areas for further research.

Terms of Reference

Military Service. Military Service, or Service, refers to the military department as a whole for the purposes of the present discussion. Because the civilian secretariat and uniformed headquarters staff both possess authorities and influence over the composition of service identity, both are considered. In this way the United States Marine Corps and navy secretariat are considered a service, as are the United States Navy and the navy secretariat.

Military force. The term military forces herein refers to all armed forces of the United States constituted for national defense. Older conventions describe land forces as “military” and sea forces as “naval”. Unless specified otherwise, present usage includes sea, air, and land forces.

Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD describes the physical military organization of the United States, from the Secretary of Defense down to the individual members of the military services. The DoD includes all uniformed personnel,

departmental civilians, and contractors in the DoD's employ, and is consistent with CJCS usage.

Joint Force. The Joint Force describes a notional community comprised of all members of the DoD, and is the basis for establishing joint identity. This conceptualization is developed further in Chapter 2.

Jointness. Jointness is the aspirational objective state of a fully integrated joint force, and the way in which the elements comprising the joint force perceive themselves as a joint force. For the purposes of the present discussion, jointness, joint military identity, and joint force identity, and joint identity are used synonymously.

CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY THEORY

This chapter explains the importance of the concept of identity to an organization and describes several key elements of organizational identity theory in order to develop a theoretical understanding that can be applied in exploring the concept of military identity. This understanding will permit the following chapter's analysis of the military services in the context of their organizational identities and subsequent assessment of the basis for a joint military identity.

Basic Theory

Broadly stated, the idea of organizational identity encompasses how the members perceive their organization in an effort to explain the organization's behavior, with this perception being grounded in those characteristics most central, enduring, and important to the organization.¹ Building on the investigation of organizational identification to explain how members related to the organizations of which they were a part, Albert Stuart and David Whetten logically progressed to investigation of the organization itself. Albert and Whetten's three decade old *Organizational Identity* is universally acclaimed as the starting point of formal organizational identity research. Today there are thousands of books and journal articles on the subject of organizational identity, and while one may be struck by the seeming speculative nature of this extensive corpus of identity theory literature, this actually stems from the endless variability in theory application caused by the unique and diverse characters of organizations under

¹ Stuart Albert and David A. Whetten, "Organizational identity," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 7 (1985): 263-295.

analysis. So many aspects of an organization can be considered—its culture, its structure, its inter-organizational relations, etc.—and so many types of organizations beg consideration—corporations, not-for-profits, academic institutions, government agencies, sports teams, etc.—that individual research efforts tend to focus on a limited number of organizational characteristics of a specific organization or type of organization. If, for example, a researcher’s purpose was to examine how the American Red Cross influences how it is perceived by the public in order to measure public propensity to donate, then internal factors such as employee identification with the Red Cross as an organization are not likely to be of importance.

The discussion of the American military from an identity theory perspective is quite limited, and the level of analysis attempted herein appears to be nonexistent in the published record. Most treatments of U.S. military or service identity are conducted at the surface level of understanding, perceiving identity in terms of capability (a common description of the DoD in interagency circles is “the 800 pound gorilla in the room”). These treatments typically are concerned with what the organization is, rather than why it is. Some authors have developed useful impressions of military service characteristics derived from top down empirical analysis—Carl Builder’s concept of institutional personality is one such example—but few if any have attempted to arrive at those characteristics from a bottom up theoretical identity construct.²

Following the lead of other identity researchers, who have used Albert and Whetten as a departure point for a research approach tailored to a specific research

² Carl H. Builder. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

question in relation to a specific organizational entity, this chapter presents a similar design. Starting with the basic concept of organizational identity as those characteristics that are most important, central, and enduring within the organization, some aspects of identity theory seem especially relevant to an investigation of military organizational identity. These aspects are the key elements of identity, the levels of identity, multiple identity organizations, and identity influence on strategic agendas.

Elements of Identity

Identity

The literature on identity theory generally falls into two categories. The first is academic inquiry into the nature of organizational identity, often with a focus on individual member relationships to the organization. This research tends to look at the internal workings and perceptions of an organization, developing identity from within. The second is found in marketing literature and addresses corporate identity, especially the role of senior leadership in managing the external affairs and perceptions of the organization. Corporate leadership assumes a strong role in creating and maintaining identity. This convenient divide between the external and internal relations of an organization often becomes blurred due to factors such as the internet, globalization, education, and social change; the organizational domains of leadership and the internal functions of subordinate or middle management and the individual begin to overlap.³

A chief facet of identity is its ability to endure, and a useful explanation for this durability is found in how organizational history is used. Anteby and Molnár

³ Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, "Relations between Organizational Culture, Identity and Image," *European Journal of Marketing* 31, no. 5/6 (1997): 356-58.

propose that identity endurance is partly a function of collective memory, and of how the organization influences the collective memory in order to reinforce and preserve identity.⁴ Collective memory is, “a reconstruction of the past that adapts images of ancient facts to present beliefs”, helping to impart a sense of historical permanence to contemporary perceptions of identity.⁵ Significant effort is required to create, change, or sustain an organization’s identity, and “identity work” is used to describe the artifacts, policies, procedures, and activities that contribute to this creation, change, or sustainment. Collective memory is expressed and reinforced through ceremonial activities and observances, incorporated practices, and tradition.⁶

The use of rhetorical history—what the organization selectively chooses to remember and what it chooses to forget about its past—allows the preservation of a specific identity. An organization systematically forgets—repeatedly and deliberately “forgetting”—facts and events that are inconsistent with or perceived as harmful to its identity construct. *Structural omission* describes the deliberate omission of potentially contradictory aspects of an organization’s true or objective history; *preemptive neutralization* is the deliberate neutralization of contradictory aspects of valued identity cues.⁷ In such a way, for example, postwar France chose to forget the memory of Nazi collaboration and reconciled the Vichy government’s existence as necessary to preserve French culture, thus creating firm ground for fostering reconciliation and national unity.

⁴ Michel Anteby and Virag Molnár, “Collective Memory Meets Organizational Identity: Remembering to Forget in a Firm’s Rhetorical History,” *Academy of Management Journal* 55, no. 3 (June 2012): 7-11.

⁵ Ibid., 7.

⁶ Ibid., 4, 6.

⁷ Ibid., 3.

A key point is that the rhetorical history that informs the collective memory of an organization is not accidental, but is purposefully constructed by the organization. A final observation on the use of rhetorical memory is a potential “ethics of memory” issue, in that radical reconstruction of the past might not be accepted, either by organizational members or by external audiences.⁸

Image

Organizational image is closely related to identity. The organizational and corporate identity literature provide numerous definitions of image. Internally defined image describes how members believe others see their organization, or how organizational elites would like others to see their organization. How others actually see the organization, irrespective of what the organization believes, is a case of externally defined image and a focus of marketing literature. Hatch and Schultz believe that a synthesis of all three characterizations of organizational image constitute the image dynamic in reality.⁹

Culture

Culture informs how an organization acts. Culture provides important context to an organization, allowing members to interpret organizational identity and permitting organizational leaders to understand approaches to managing organizational image. While it is possible for organizational culture to change, it is a relative constant when compared to the malleability of identity. Culture’s relative constancy over time in an

⁸ Anteby and Molnár, 3, 35-37.

⁹ Hatch and Schultz, 358-59.

organization provides a stable organizational factor that serves to manipulate organizational understanding and action. Culture influences perceptions; perceptions reinforce identity. By extension, the organizational identity and image presented to external audiences are, in turn, subjected to their cultural interpretation.¹⁰

Interrelationship of Identity, Image, and Culture

While the idea that organizational identity, image, and culture exist as separate, ontologically equal concepts persist in the literature, Hatch and Schultz believe the blurring of the boundaries of organizational internal and external relations has appropriately shifted emphasis to a dynamic involving all three. Identity defines what an organization will do; culture defines how action is expressed; when the internal and external images of the organizational action are consistent with organizational expectation, then actions are consistent with identity.¹¹

Levels of Identity

When an organization is stratified in composition, with each strata having clearly distinct degrees of authority and responsibility, each strata assumes a unique understanding of its identity. Even a flat organizational structure witnesses such a hierarchical nature for the purposes of identity, as at minimum there exists both organizational and individual levels of identity. Organizations commonly feature three distinct types of organizational levels, these being the organization itself (corporate headquarters), sub-organization(s) (middle management), and the individual member

¹⁰ Hatch and Schultz, 360-61.

¹¹ Ibid., 358.

(employee). There may be little similarity or mutual identification between sub-organizations, but both still may identify strongly with the parent organization. When an organization is so large or dispersed that personal interface between the levels of organization becomes difficult or impossible, then successful organizations employ the *idea of the organization* to reinforce a larger sense of identity. The literature on organizational identity and collective memory agree that such “imagined communities” serve to bind organizational members together. Imagined communities establish a level of organizational identity constructed primarily through historical understanding and the idea of the organization rather than by personal interaction; it is akin to an institutional reputation.¹²

Multiple Identity

Social identity theory premises that individuals classify themselves based on social and demographic groups, essentially creating concentric rings of identity. Organizational identity and sub-organizational identities make up some of these rings of identity, which are prioritized according to the degree of individual attachment. Individual attachment is a function of the congruence of a given identity with the other identities to which an individual values. When the degree of congruence is high, the individual’s sense of identification is high also, closing the gap between “who I am” and “who we are.”¹³

By extension, the concept of identity congruence applies to organizations and their sub-organizations as well, and lies at the heart of explaining the dynamic that

¹² Anteby and Molnar, 6.

¹³ Foreman and Whetten, 619.

maintains the relationship between the different levels of identity within an organization. The concept of identity congruence also leads one to explore the possibility of an organization possessing multiple peer-equivalent identities, that is, an organization possessing two or more identities (such as John Deere, recognized as a leading manufacturer of residential lawn care equipment and as a manufacturer of heavy commercial construction machinery). When overall organizational success hinges on sub-organizational identification with multiple parent identities, then the relative strength of each individual identity congruence emerges as a potential indicator of organizational efficiency.

The literature is rife with definitions for a multiple identity organization, so again Whetten's pioneering work in this area affords critical understanding. Whetten's definition for what he termed a *hybrid-identity organization* is that of an organization, "whose identity is composed of two or more types that would not normally be expected to go together. . . . [I]t is not simply an organization with multiple components, but it considers itself (and others consider it), alternatively, or even simultaneously, to be two different types of organization."¹⁴ A simple multiple identity organization, then, is one in which the identities possess a high degree of compatibility, such as a small dairy farm that also produces cheese, two separate money making enterprises; a dairy farm that also produces motorcycles would be a hybrid-identity organization. Sometimes what might appear as multiple identities are really multiple facets of a single organization, such as a national cheese producer that also owns dairy farms, its sources of supply. The distinction between a multiple identity organization and an organization with multiple

¹⁴ Foreman and Whetten, 621.

purposes is not always clear, at least in part due to a high degree of congruence. It is the seeming incompatibility of identities in a hybrid-identity organization which lends itself as a model for subsequent analysis of joint military identity.¹⁵

Van Rekom and van Riel's review of methods to operationally explain the dynamics of organizational identity offers the table below. Their notional depiction of the relationship between a parent corporation and a subordinate operating division has many possible touch points for influence, and illustrates the difficulty of achieving a balanced (equal) hybrid identity.

van Riel's assessment model of multiple identity organizations, based on corporate branding¹⁶:

	a. No Endorsement (Variety)	b. Weak Endorsement	c. Medium Endorsement	d. Strong Endorsement (Uniformity)
Visualization	'business unit name'	'business unit name' member of 'parent company name' (logo)	'parent company name' (logo) 'business unit name'	'parent company name' (logo) 'specialization'
Example	Barings	Barings 'member of ING (lion)'	ING (lion) Barings	ING (lion) Investment Banking
Identity Strategy	Stand-alone, low degree of parent visibility, high degree of autonomy at business unit level.	Low degree of parent visibility, used by companies in a transition phase of complete autonomy towards integration into an integrated market approach.	High degree of parent visibility, no consistent fit with key elements of the corporate message.	High parent visibility, high degree of identification with corporate level, high degree of transparency, strict coordination of communication strategy, showing strength of the group.

In multiple identity organizations, especially those with hybrid identities, it is logical to find differing expectations between the constituents of each identity, but Foreman and Whetten look for differing expectations of each identity from the organization's individual members as well. While members may identify with both (or

¹⁵ Foreman and Whetten, 621.

¹⁶ Johan van Rekom and Cees B. M. van Riel, "Operational Measures of Organizational Identity: A Review of Existing Methods", *Corporate Reputation Review* 3 no. 4 (2008): 338.

more) organizational identities, there exists the probability that these instances of individual identification—the degrees of congruence between the individual and organizational identity values—will be unequal. When this inequality exists, a condition of organizational identity dominance prevails.¹⁷

Foreman and Whetten explore individual identification more deeply, defining an individual's organizational commitment as a function of his attachment to the organization. This attachment is a composite of two forms, *attitudinal attachment* and *behavioral attachment*. Attitudinal attachment is grounded in psychology and a person's emotions; loyalty and sentimentality, factors that affect attitude, reinforce (or undermine) an individual's proclivity for attachment. Behavioral attachment is reflective of an individual's "sunk costs" in an organization, as measured by his invested time, political capital, experience, knowledge, and other resources; the strength of the attachment bond correlates to the difficulty of walking away from this personal investment.

Organizational commitment is then bisected into two types: affective commitment, in which the individual wants to remain part of an organization, out of loyalty or similar reasons; and continuance commitment, when—even if presented external opportunities and options—the individual is compelled to stay with the organization for reasons of personal benefit and resources.¹⁸

¹⁷ Foreman and Whetten, 631.

¹⁸ Ibid., 620-21.

Application of Identity

Rhetorical History

Rhetorical history emerges as a powerful tool when applied in pursuit of organizational objectives. Organizations leverage their rhetorical history—sometimes even editing their history further if warranted by situational urgency—in order to legitimize or delegitimize specific strategic options or to build external competitive advantage, with either their members and constituents, or external audiences—or both—being targeted.¹⁹

Strategic Agenda

A strategic issue for an organization fundamentally is any phenomenon perceived as being able to impact the organization's performance. The nature of any given issue might then relate to either an organization's internal or external relations—a labor strike in the case of the former, for example, or a competitor's unexpected release of a new product line in the case of the latter. An organization's strategic agenda is comprised of those strategic issues which at any given point occupy the attention of the organization's top decision makers. When the attention that top decision makers are able to devote to these issues is a scarce resource, then choosing issues for inclusion on the agenda becomes a rigorous process, and leader attention allocation becomes a precursor—and a marker—of organizational decision making.²⁰

¹⁹ Anteby and Molnar, 10.

²⁰ Jane E. Dutton and Wendy J. Penner, "The Importance of Organizational Identity for Strategic Identity Building," in *Strategic Thinking: Leadership and the Management of Change*, ed. J. Hendry and G. Johnson (The Strategic Management Society: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1993), 90-91.

Some indicators that an issue has been elevated to a strategic level of importance to the organization include assigning a name to the issue; the investment of time and resources in an issue; initiatives to gather further information about an issue; or establishing a workgroup or taskforce to further study an issue. Inclusion on the agenda requires that three criteria be satisfied: the issue must be legitimate; it must be important to the organization (important enough to warrant attention allocation; and it must lend itself to a feasible resolution.²¹

What makes the strategic agenda an important tool for organizational analysis is that the process of issue identification—putting items on the agenda—is informed by organizational identity. Whether an individual or a group within the organization identifies an issue as strategic, their perception of the issue is influenced and framed by organizational understanding of similar issues. This dynamic helps explain why an issue to one organization is perceived as a threat while another sees only opportunity for innovation.²²

Dutton and Penner identify two means of accomplishing strategic agenda building. The first can be characterized as a change agent, the actions of an individual to sell an issue for consideration, “creat[ing] momentum for action through legitimation of an idea or solution.” The issue seller fundamentally is in the right place, at the right time, and possesses the right credentials. The second means is through coalition mobilization, a group of individuals within an organization who attempt to influence organizational

²¹ Dutton and Penner, 91-94. But even when an issue is “named”, there is the possibility that subordinate levels of leadership and organization may arrive at different understanding of the issue, potentially undermining any organizational effort to address or influence the issue.

²² Ibid., 93-94.

priorities by identifying and “mobilizing” around a key issue requiring decision or resolution. Herein lies a key difference between the two: the issue seller typically is attached to a particular solution or recommendation, whereas the coalition normally seeks only to raise an issue for senior leader consideration. In addition to these two means of issue identification, there is at least a third, and that is senior leader issue identification accompanied by the authority to put it on the strategic agenda.²³

Now armed with a theoretical understanding of organizational identity, the next chapter explores the nature of the military organization to which it will be applied.

²³ Dutton and Penner, 92.

CHAPTER 3: MILITARY ORGANIZATION

This chapter examines the environment that shapes the services and DoD as organizations and that enables and influences identity development. Military policy, the legal basis on which U.S. military organizations rest, emerges as a strong factor in their organizational development and becomes key to Chapter 4's discussion of military identity.

Organizational Environment

All organizations have purposes they are intended to accomplish, and these understandably exert great influence on organizational structure. Additional environmental factors influence organizational development as well. Francis Laurent, in making recommendations for defense reform at the end of the Eisenhower administration, noted that American military reformers seldom took account of the history associated with organizing the military defense of the United States; he believed that appreciation of the historical record would result in better informed decisions concerning organizational reform.¹

Laurent found six persistent factors influencing and complicating decisions affecting the organizational development of the military establishment as an efficient tool of U.S. national policy. First, the doctrines of separation of powers among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government and of civilian control over the military serve to define the parameters of military authorities and responsibilities. Second, threats

¹ Francis W. Laurent, *Organization for Military Defense of the United States* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin National Security Studies Group, 1960), 1.

to national security, as well as the responses to threats, are important stimuli to military organizations. Third, the impact of science and technology innovations on the means of war, especially rapid innovation, helps define aspects of necessary organizational change. Fourth, dependence on outside organizations compels military organizational structures to accommodate such dependence (for example, particularly germane today is the need for the military to function as part of an interagency whole). Fifth is the application of social sciences and management planning concepts—concepts originating in academia and the private sector—to modernize organizational functions and processes. Sixth, senior officials of military organizations that are successful and functioning tend to be reluctant to make fundamental or sweeping organizational changes.² To these six a seventh factor should be considered: the pivotal role that organizational purpose plays in how military organizations seek to express themselves.

These seven factors can be grouped according to whether their effects are felt primarily internally or externally to the organization, with internal factors being those over which the organization demonstrates a degree of control and which define the limits of organizational control. Three of the seven are predominantly internal in their effects, with the first being organizational purpose. Purpose is a key consideration, as it describes the *raison d'être* for an organization's being, and is the broad azimuth that the organization internalizes to guide its actions. Second is the separation of governmental powers and civilian control over the military—in short, military policy—that are expressed through the legal basis for constitution of the armed forces. Military policy defines the authorities and responsibilities through which organizational purpose is

² Laurent, 1-6.

achieved.³ Threats to security, because they are the primary focus of military purpose, necessarily become the basis for military historical narrative; this derived historical narrative comprises the third internal factor. Threats exist as external events that trigger organizational response, but when the historical record of these threats—and of the responses to them—is internalized by the military organization, it becomes assimilated into the organization’s collective memory.⁴ This organizational perception and management of history, within the context of purpose and law, is a powerful internal factor in its ability to affect organizational stability and change. External dependencies, technological innovation, and the social sciences reflect primarily external considerations, but when manifested as part of statutory mandate or within a threat response, their effects also become internalized. Leader resistance to organizational change is neither an internal nor external factor, but is a product of internal factors; it is a function of leader attachment to the existing organization. Purpose, military policy, and history comprise the key elements that define the nature of military organizations.

Military Purpose

Purpose is simple in nature, but can be complex in derivation. At least three sources in combination shape military organizational purpose. Congress designates in

³ Requisite authorities often lag behind assignment of responsibility. Constitutional responsibilities with respect to the militia provide such an example. The President and Congress gained broad authority and responsibility to command and regulate the militia in 1789, respectively, but it wasn’t until 1794 that Congress passed legislation (the two Militia Acts of 1792) establishing the statutory authorities necessary to implement these Constitutional responsibilities. Among other provisions, the position of Adjutant General was mandated in each state and territory, and was the mechanism through which Congress would ensure the training and discipline of the militia and through which the President would call the militia into federal service. *Militia Acts of 1792*, 2d Congress, 1st sess. (May 2, 1792, and May 8, 1792). http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm (accessed July 17, 2015).

⁴ Military organizational histories typically pay special attention to battles and campaigns, the heroic efforts of individuals and inspired leadership—the organizational elements viewed as instrumental in achieving organizational purpose.

statute the legal purposes of the armed forces, in accordance with its Constitutional authority and responsibility. Secondly, other purposes (or missions) may be assigned by the Executive, consistent with the president's Constitutional role as commander in chief of the armed forces; these might be described as "other duties as assigned". Lastly is the organization's interpretation of its underlying purpose, incorporating unique organizational values. The United States Army's role as reflected in *Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army*, illustrates all three purposes. *ADP 1* reiterates the Army's statutory purpose (to defend the nation . . .), enumerates its major additional Executive-directed purposes (which include civil works and disaster response), and perceives its purpose as being the indispensable land power element of joint operations, without which victory in war is not possible.⁵

Military Policy

Military policy establishes much of the limitation (or structure, depending on one's perspective) in which the American military exists, so a working definition of such policy seems warranted at this point. Howard White's analysis, although nearly a century old, remains instructional on this point. In his exploration of Executive influence in military policy, he defined military policy formulation as the legislative process of creating, organizing, maintaining, regulating, and employing the armed forces.⁶ White observed a historical continuity in Congressional interest in the personnel strength of American land and naval forces, and deeper concern in how personnel would be procured

⁵ Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 1: The Army* (Washington, DC, 2012), 1-1 through 1-8.

⁶ Howard White, *Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1925), 9.

in times of war when it seemed apparent that force goals would not be met. Most useful, however, is his recognition of an overall pattern of Congressional and Executive policy influence.

White found that from 1789 through the 1920 Defense Act, four periods operating in a cyclical fashion strongly correlate to suggest a pattern of influence in military policy, these periods being peace, preparation for war, war, and transition to peace.⁷ Congress is least likely to accept in peacetime the President's requests for resources and statutory authorities allowing him to prepare for and prosecute a notional war, and is most likely to approve the President's requests and grant him additional latitude during periods of active warfare. During periods of likely or imminent conflict, Congress typically will concede to the President's requests if the danger is minor, but will waffle—and delay significant decisions—if the threat is major. When wars begin to wind down, and peace is in the offing, Congress begins to reassert itself in military policy making. A prime example contemporary to White's research is America's experience in WWI, in which Congress approved appropriations in 1916 and 1917 for Army and Navy modernization and growth in anticipation of war; by 1920, Congress was seeking in the 1920 National Defense Act to curb the wartime expansion of Executive military powers.⁸ The subsequent history of American military policy remains consistent with White's original research. After the United States entered WWII, Congress passed the War Powers Act, giving President Roosevelt expansive authority over the entire American war effort. After a purported North Vietnamese attack on a US naval vessel and fears of a

⁷ White, 271-75.

⁸ Ibid., 244-252, 261-265.

broader Communist threat to U.S. interests, Congress gave President Johnson virtual carte blanche authority to conduct the war in Vietnam. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress did little to oppose President Bush's decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. And just as White would have predicted, Congress quickly took up the policy reins as conflicts were ending—with significant mandated force reductions—following WWII, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

While White seizes upon Congress's legislative authority as the key to understanding the evolution of U.S. military policy and organization, Locher identifies the symptoms only as they manifest in the services. In the opening pages of *Victory on the Potomac* Locher mentions—but fails to appreciate the significance of—the ultimate source of service resistance to Congressional interference in matters of military organization, and that is the body of previous legislation that fundamentally permitted the service chiefs to act as they did. Add to this the phenomenon noted by White in which members of the Congressional military committees tend to wed themselves to specific service and branch viewpoints and recommendations. Committee members come to believe that the key to American defense lies in the success of “their” service; rather than evincing arch service parochialism, service chiefs and their congressional advocates are instead revealed to be acting in the best interests of the nation.⁹

The creation of large—and permanent—standing forces following WWII of the type, scale, and scope desired by the military services marks a milestone, as opposed to a beginning point, in the evolution of American military capability. For some, the

⁹ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 5-6; White, 275-76.

establishment of large, permanent regular forces in peacetime represented a complete upset of an American military tradition that fundamentally based national defense means on a large militia and a relatively small regular cadre of forces that had prevailed in law since 1789.¹⁰ Upon widening the historical aperture, however, the postwar military structure is seen as being fully consistent with both Congressional action over time as well as the experience and intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Historically, the relative proportions of the regular and militia establishments are *variable*; the *constant* lies in the principle of adopting the minimum standing military force necessary to ensure the security of American interests, and to do so through legal authority.¹¹

England's motivation for colonizing America primarily was economic in nature. The incentive to maximize revenue and minimize administrative costs was high. Defense was an administrative cost, not only in terms of arms and equipment but in manpower diverted from economic pursuits; at the same time, inadequate defense could

¹⁰ Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 538-544; Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), 367-68, 380-81; Walter Millis, "Military Problems at the Close of World War II," *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society*, Russell F. Weigley, ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), 115-16.

¹¹ George Washington was probably the first to articulate to Congress the attractiveness of maintaining the minimum necessary standing force in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment", prepared in 1783. The debates of the Federal Convention of 1787 over the roles and reliability of standing forces and militia were hotly considered, and reinforced a commitment to maintain extant military capability sufficient to satisfy immediate security needs, to be reinforced in time of war by the militia. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, author of the United States' first practical military policy in 1820, advocated a larger army commensurate with greater military responsibilities, but reaffirmed that the army overall should be as small as practicable to execute its duties. These duties included a credible showing at either deterring or repulsing enemy action at the outbreak of hostilities, while Congress made provision for expanding military forces; Calhoun's prescription remained the substance of American policy up through WWII. George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society*, Russell F. Weigley, ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), 4; James Madison, *Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787* (1840; repr., New York: Ohio University Press, 1987), 214, 481-82, 639; John C. Calhoun, "Report on the Reduction of the Army," (1820; repr., *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society*, Russell F. Weigley, ed., 9-12.

result in loss of the colony—and of all potential profit. Royal grants and charters made it clear that the colonies were to be responsible for their own security.¹² Issues of economy, given limited revenues, and of military effectiveness, in view of a nearly persistent and occasionally existential threat posed by Native American tribes, were factors of immediate interest to colonial governors and legislatures. Colonial observers of events in England witnessed in the English Civil War the threat a military force could present to a modern civil government, and consequently were cautious to organize defensive forces strong enough to provide protection when needed, but not strong enough to challenge civil authority. This relationship of economy, military effectiveness, and civil authority gradually became a defining characteristic of colonial American military institutions, and was deeply engrained in the colonial political psyche by the time of the French and Indian War and the semi-permanent arrival of British regular troops.¹³

The Framers recognized the military effectiveness of regulars and similar bodies of standing forces, but were compelled to consider the attendant risks to treasury and Republic. The Federalists, favoring a strong central government, believed that reliance on a citizen-militia to provide for American security was misplaced, and advocated a regular army establishment. The Antifederalists (Republicans) pointed past militia military successes, depicting the militia as the perfect and appropriate expression of Republican military force and guarantor of individual liberty. Given the insular nature of the threats confronting the new American Republic and the relatively simple tactics

¹² Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1907), 1:142, 1:496-97, 1:521-23, 2:377-79.

¹³ Lawrence D. Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 8-9; Mark E. Lender and James K. Martin, *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789*, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan-Davidson, Inc., 2006), 208.

and technology of warfare that then prevailed, it was a fairly logical compromise—for the majority of attendees at the Constitutional convention, anyway—to invest in a system of security dependent on a large militia and a small regular establishment. The underlying principle of this military structure, embedded in a century and a half of colonial experience, was that America should possess the most capable military force it could afford, while remaining consistent with need and the preservation of the political ideals of the Republic.¹⁴

This understanding renders the experience of WWII and the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff as not so much of a defining experience, and the National Security Act of 1947 as not so much of a defining action, as they are illustrative of how American military organization adapts to its environment in accordance with historical regularity. While WWII proved to be a victory of joint arms, it also witnessed a steep learning curve as the U.S. military developed the skills, doctrine, equipment—and leadership—necessary for the conduct of service and joint operations. The 1947 National Security Act’s intent, and that of subsequent legislation, was to eliminate this now historical requirement for extensive organizational development at the point of crisis by increasing wartime effectiveness and peacetime readiness.¹⁵ The Navy and War Departments already were thinking about the same problem before the tide of war had turned in the Allies’ favor, albeit with not the same focus on joint capability.¹⁶

¹⁴ Cress, 97-109; Lender and Martin, 208-09.

¹⁵ Zegart, 117.

¹⁶ Elliott V. Converse III, *Circling the Earth: United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2005), 1-4.

American war planning on the eve of WWII was still grounded in the strategic precepts of the Monroe Doctrine. This principal conception of American defense policy was subordinated to a larger war planning framework, one in which the United States would think and act globally, once hostilities became imminent.¹⁷ America's entry into both World Wars had been from a standing start, necessitating huge efforts to organize, train, equip, and deploy forces for combat. Realizing that the luxury of time in which to fully mobilize industry and prepare for war would be an unlikely occurrence in the next war, American postwar military planning, begun in earnest by late 1942, envisioned not only much enlarged peacetime forces but also their selective forward deployment at globally dispersed strategic sea, air, and land bases. Only by defending America at points distant from her shores could the economic capacity and political will necessary for victory in modern war be sustained. The subsequent rise of the Soviet Union as the greatest probable military challenger to the United States only served to reinforce the need to rebalance the composition of U.S. standing military forces.¹⁸

General Organizational Characteristics

Environmental factors and shared intrinsic values allow a general depiction of a military organization as distinct from any other type of organization. Military policy determination equates to “identity work” in that the actions of military organizations working within policy and statutory limits are influenced by their identity and therefore

¹⁷ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1986), 5-8, 25-28.

¹⁸ Converse, 1-4, 167-74.

tend to reinforce a sense of identity. Against this general depiction of a military service one is able to begin constructing a suitable model for examining organizational identity.

CHAPTER 4: SERVICE AND JOINT IDENTITY

This chapter explores service and joint identity in the context of Chapter 2's theoretical constructs and in light of the last chapter's development of the historical basis of American military organization. Key subordinate factors, to include organizational culture and vision, are considered. Discussion defines the joint military environment sufficiently to examine it for the critical elements necessary to establish organizational identity in accordance with the theory, and then focuses on illuminating the elements of service and joint identity in order to permit comparative analysis of their strengths and weaknesses.

Organizational Identity

Chapter 2 made the case for considering organizational identity as the inseparable product of both internal and external organizational relations. An example of such overlap occurred with the adoption of the All Volunteer Force in the early 1970s, which ended reliance on the draft, a stable constant in military planning to that point. Manpower procurement immediately became an unknown variable and a pressing concern for the service chiefs (corporate leadership), while subordinate commands (middle management) had to adapt to a differing set of recruit (member) expectations.

Organizational Image

Service concern with external image perception grew in importance following the Vietnam War. The belief that public support for American military commitment is essential to maintaining that commitment was pivotally reinforced by Colonel Harry

Summer's analysis of the war.¹ This use of rhetorical history further compelled the services to positively influence public opinion to ensure victory in the next conflict.² The adoption of the All Volunteer Force also reinforced the need to reach out to the public, since now the ranks would have to be recruited rather than drafted. Enticing civilians to enter military service became a much more important career field than it had been under the draft.³ These reasons continue to influence Army efforts to affect the Army's external image in order to garner public support today. A clear example of Army (corporate) leadership's deliberate attempt to manipulate its image occurred during the 2015 Independence Day holiday. Along with 30 second television commercial spots, the short video "Independence" was delivered directly to viewers as a popup when they visited selected websites (www.esquire.com for one).⁴

Organizational Culture

An organization's narrative of its creation, coupled with its organizational purpose, can be a powerful influence in shaping culture and identity. The historical narrative gains palpable strength from a noble purpose and heroic creation. Defending the nation, a common purpose to the services and DoD, clearly is noble in its reach; but an organizational epic that claims a role in *creating* the nation as well is a wellspring of institutional inspiration. The Army traces its heritage to the Continental Army, creating

¹ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 11-19.

² ADP I, 4-1.

³ Bernard D. Rostker, *The Evolution of the All Volunteer Force: History and Analysis* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 84-86.

⁴ The Army "Independence" commercial spot as of this writing can be found at the Go Army website (<http://www.goarmy.com/my-independence.html>) and on Youtube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aY6JU_R6jvA) .

an Army narrative that places it “there at the beginning”.⁵ The reality is that the Continental Army came into being when the Army of New England, comprised of combined militia from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, was taken into Continental service.⁶ The longer periods of service of the Continentals, their identification with a national level army organization, and their training, experience, and discipline (helped in large measure by their longer periods of service) generally conform to the description of a regular army, and have been adopted by the Army’s sense of self. The formal establishment of a United States Army by legislation following Constitutional ratification in 1789 simply serves to validate the Army’s pre-existing sense of identity.⁷

The situation of the Air Force differs entirely from the Army’s, and by no stretch of imagination could airman claim an instrumental role in the nation’s founding. The Air Force’s origin myth lies in its long struggle for the establishment of an independent Air Force, so that its mastery of a unique means and technology of war could be effectively harnessed in the nation’s defense.⁸

When compared to such grand origin myths as those of the Army and Air Force, the Joint Force’s attempt to hold up the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff and the experience of successful joint operations seems somehow feeble. Even though joint

⁵ ADP I, v.

⁶ Galvin, *The Minute Men*, 238-243.

⁷ Matloff, 46.

⁸ “The creation of the United States Air Force in September 1947 was both an end and a beginning. It marked the end of the long fight for independence. It signaled the beginning of the effort to bring the Air Force to true parity with the Army and the Navy.” Herman S. Wolk, *The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943-1947*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 1997), 195.

warfighting rightfully claims substantial credit for the invasion of France and other joint operations, the service narratives emphasize the indispensable nature of service roles in order to reinforce service identity.

Levels of Identity

Levels of identity exist as several types in military organizations. The levels created by successive echelons of command are obvious, as from department, to ship, to squadron, to fleet in the Navy, or from flight, to group, to wing, to numbered air force in the Air Force. More relevant to the current examination of service and joint identity are the levels of organizational purpose that correspond to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. The fact that very few joint units exist at the tactical level (and these represent highly specialized capabilities such as Weapons of Mass Destruction detection) and that new enlistees and officer accessions predominantly start their military careers and social norming at the tactical service level, means that the inculcation of service identity and culture can produce strong attitudinal attachment. There is no joint competition for the individual service member's sense of identity at the point when they are most easily influenced. This fact seems at odds with the source of joint inefficiency at the tactical level as primarily being one of interoperability (due to differing doctrine, equipment, training, etc.) rather than one of willingness to cooperate. The record of joint defense reform from 1947 through Goldwater-Nichols highlights that the fact that tactical inefficiencies result from service-centric planning, resourcing, and employment decisions.⁹ The force management, force structure, and training, the factors on which

⁹ Zegart, 109-30; Laurent, 59; Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 15-32; Jones, 140-47.

interoperability is built, remain under the control of the service headquarters. This observation suggests that jointness exists to differing degrees at different points in the joint military environment, and that the relative strength of jointness increases as one moves from strategic to operational to tactical levels within the Department of Defense, is a key aspect of joint identity.

Hybrid-Organizational Identity

Joint identity can only exist as a concept derived from service identities; without the services there can be no joint identity. This coexistence of identities is the source of tension as each corporate enterprise seeks to garner sufficient resources and direct its actions in order to achieve core organizational functions and purpose. The relative strength and competing nature of Service and Joint identities establishes their relationship as a hybrid organizational identity. Chapter 2's introduction of van Rekom and van Riel's depiction of a notional hybrid identity organization is adapted below to illustrate a service's, in this instance the Army, identity relationship to the joint force.

van Riel's model, adapted to depict the Joint Force¹⁰:

	a. No Endorsement (Variety)	b. Weak Endorsement	c. Medium Endorsement	d. Strong Endorsement (Uniformity)
Visualization	'service component'	'service component' member of the 'defense enterprise'	'defense enterprise' 'service component'	'defense enterprise' 'service functionality'
Example	U.S. Army	U.S. Army, part of the Joint Force	Joint Force, U.S. Army	Joint Force land component
Identity Strategy	Stand-alone, low degree of Joint Force visibility, high degree of autonomy at Service component level.	Low degree of Joint Force visibility, used by the defense enterprise in a transition phase of complete Service autonomy towards integration into an integrated Total Force approach.	High degree of Joint Force visibility, but inconsistent fit of Service components into Joint Force conceptualization	High degree of Joint Force visibility, high degree of identification with defense enterprise, strict coordination of communication strategy, showing strength of the group (Joint Force)

¹⁰ van Rekom and van Riel, 338.

Van Riel's model presents a structure by which to assess the relationship of service and joint identity, but does not explain why the relationship exists as it does. Relationship A – no substantive Service identification with a larger defense enterprise – clearly was dominant through 1986 and the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.¹¹ In terms of organizational identity, Goldwater-Nichols's express purpose was to correct the inefficiencies introduced into the defense enterprise by exclusive Service self-identification. Goldwater-Nichols initiated a period of change consistent with van Riel's Relationship B, the transition from strong Service autonomy to strong integration into a Total Force of all components. While it is possible to find examples of organizational leadership espousing publicly their 'medium' to 'strong' endorsement of the Joint Force, the Services and Joint Force remain fundamentally stuck in the transition phase, where the service identity is dominant. The concept of identity congruence helps to explain this dominance in instances where service identity is so deeply engrained that joint identification seems inconsistent. Attitudinal attachment, as mentioned, may undermine the development of jointness since organizational enculturation is dominated by the services. The services also control personnel assignments, promotions, and professional schooling, so the behavioral attachment of an individual to his service is likely to be high.

An Exception to the Dominance Rule

The WWII example demonstrates how two equally strong, but adversarial, identities may coexist in a hybrid-organizational identity relationship in which neither is

¹¹ In terms of legislated structure, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms closely resemble the measures implemented during the Eisenhower administration in 1958. The earlier law contained sufficient wiggle room for the services to largely continue as they had before, dominating both the maintenance and readiness of forces as well as their employment. Goldwater-Nichols sought to close loopholes. Stephen R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," in *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996), 13.

clearly dominant. The National Guard illustrates another military organizational example in which the theoretically incompatible identities of a federally (service) controlled military force and a state controlled military force comprise a hybrid identity. The National Guard actually exists as two separate legally constituted organizations, which confusingly share the same name. The National Guard of the States is the organized portion of the militia force mandated by the Constitution; the National Guard of the United States, since the National Defense Act of 1916, is a federal reserve of the Army (and of the Air Force since 1947), pursuant to statutory authorities in the United States Code.¹² Congress exercised its Constitutional authorities to provide for the discipline of the militia and for the regulation of the Army (the services) to establish the National Guard as a federal military reserve, establishing a dual-identity in law.¹³ Because the National Guard's state and federal identities are equally embedded in law, and each supported by strong historical narrative, the state and federal identities coexist to the extent that even the National Guard refers to itself as a single organization with two missions, as opposed to two legally distinct organizations.¹⁴ The WWII and National Guard examples demonstrate the possibility for—and potential of—a hybrid organizational identity of nominal equals.

¹² U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 16; *U.S. Code*, §§ 10105, 10111, 12405.

¹³ U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12; *Ibid.*, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 14.

¹⁴ Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 371. Doubler confuses the Constitutional authority of the president to call the *militia* into federal service with statutory authorities to bring the *National Guard* as a *federal reserve* into federal service.

Relative Strength and Weaknesses of Joint Identity

The relatively stable permanency of the services—in terms of their statutory and historical functions and purposes, organizational lineage, and legitimacy derived from sacrifice in defense of American society—as contrasted with joint identity reveals much of the basis for the individual strength of service organizational identity. The primary strengths of jointness are its statutory basis and its ability to generate significant tactical and operational military efficiency, but jointness currently lacks the critical elements of organizational function and organizational history to the degree found in the Services.

The joint environment shaped by Goldwater-Nichols is fundamentally different than its WWII counterpart. Today, Congressional legislation has directly shaped a joint environment in which the military services are predominantly responsible for resourcing the force, the CCMDs have the lead for strategic and operational planning, and the POTUS and SECDEF provide strategic guidance directly to consumers. CJCS has relatively slight influence, as do the JCS except in the case of resources, compared to WWII. In WWII, the Congress passed the First War Powers Act less than two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, giving Roosevelt broad authorities with respect to organizing the War and Navy Departments and all other Executive departments and agencies.¹⁵ It is with this conferred authority that the President established the JCS and assigned it expansive powers concerning resourcing, strategic planning, and strategic execution. The wartime JCS assumed a central role in the allocation and prioritization of forces and war resources; in the conduct of strategic planning and direction; and in

¹⁵ The *War Powers Act of 1941*, often referred to as the *First War Powers Act*, conferred on the president near absolute organizational authority within the Executive for the duration of the war plus six months. *War Powers Act of 1941*, U.S. Congress, December 18, 1941, text of act accessed at http://www.zaoerv.de/11_1942_43/11_1942_1_b_649_652.pdf (accessed July 27, 2015).

strategic execution and support for campaigns.¹⁶ The chiefs advised and conferred with the president on a regular basis, to the near exclusion of significant roles for the service secretaries. While inter-service rivalry and turf battles continued unabated—the competition between the Army and Navy over responsibility for amphibious training in the preparation for the Normandy invasion is but one of many heated examples—the degree of joint authority exercised by the JCS, as well as the frequent intervention by the president, were sufficient to overcome service resistance.

The joint dynamic today exists in a far different form. The JCS actually exercise little of the power they wielded during WWII. Strategic resourcing, with few exceptions, is dominated by the services, under the authority of their “Title 10” responsibilities to organize, equip, and train their forces. The majority of planning in direct support of national security strategic objectives is accomplished by the combatant commands, in a process managed by the CJCS (the Joint Strategic Planning System). Through execution of their campaign plans, the combatant commanders also exercise a great deal of strategic shaping in order to attain national strategic objectives. Finally the Joint Chiefs, in both their capacities as Joint Chiefs and Service Chiefs, have been removed from all strategic, operational, and tactical chains of command.¹⁷ The JCS certainly are not powerless, but their power is a shadow of its WWII self.

¹⁶ James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), 71-74; Laurent, 14; Matloff and Snell, 161, 194, 352.

¹⁷ Locher, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 13-15.

CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF JOINTNESS

The questions of “is joint identity necessary” and “how much jointness is enough?” are apparent at this point. This chapter makes recommendations on how to reinforce joint identity without compromising the beneficial aspects of the individual military services. The assignment of statutory responsibility for organizing, manning, training, and equipping the Joint Force, with attendant budget authority on a level commensurate with the military services, would increase the permanence and stability of the concept of jointness and reinforce the basis of Joint identity.

The Value of Joint Identity

The potential value of a stronger joint force identity is tremendous. Both theory and assessed service practice demonstrate the impact that the active interaction of identity, culture, and image can have on organizational conduct. Service identity helps ensure that service actions are consistent with organizational values, objectives, and priorities; it imparts a strong sense of place, purpose, and focus to service inter-organizational relations, facilitating the achievement of service goals and priorities; and it provides a coherent basis for managing external relations and image perception. While identity helps services preserve their organizations according to their own definitions of what they ought to be, the services’ underlying and consistent motive is to remain able to accomplish their organizational mission and purpose, which ultimately translates into achieving tactical efficiency as defined by the services. In a hybrid-organizational relationship comprised of the services and the joint force in which the services are

dominant, service defined tactical efficiency will dominate over joint defined tactical efficiency. The relatively stable permanency of the services—in terms of their statutory and historical functions and purposes, organizational lineage, and legitimacy derived from sacrifice in defense of American society—as contrasted with joint identity reveals much of the basis for the individual strength of service organizational identity. The relative weakness of joint identity relative to the services provides a clue as to why joint force effectiveness falls short of what has been envisioned for it. Strengthening joint identity will lead to overall improvement in joint force efficiency.

Actions Necessary to Invigorate Joint Identity

The key factors involved in developing, sustaining, and promulgating strong service identities have been shown to lie in the legal authorities that define the “identity work” services may engage in, and the way in which the services use historical narrative in conjunction with identity, culture, and image. The critical inflection point—the point at which the balance of joint and service equities appears most susceptible to influence—is the strategic agenda. Organizational identity finds expression in how agenda items are presented for consideration—through an issue seller or coalition mobilization—and in how organizational leaders decide on those issues. The following recommendations focus on active shaping of strategic agendas and on more passively influencing the individuals (sellers, coalitions, leaders) responsible for issue identification and resolution.

1. Strengthen Joint Statutory Authorities

Statutory authorities that mandate greater joint consideration in resourcing, planning of employment, and operational execution of the joint force should be enacted. In order for joint identity to compete efficiently with service identities (whether the

balance is adversarial or collegial in nature makes no difference), efforts should be made to increase the strength of joint authorities. Both sides need to be strong in areas that compel the other's attention, and be roughly equal in degree. Weak joint identity reinforces service dominance, risking status quo; should the joint force become dominant, the dilution of service uniqueness—and dulling of their warfighting abilities—becomes a danger.

The key to improving joint tactical efficiency is reinforcing joint identity of senior service officers responsible for shaping service composition and capability, primarily through execution of service Title 10 responsibilities. Jointness could be rapidly imposed by such changes as removing the cost limit on projects requiring review and approval by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which would increase joint power and ability to influence procurement outcomes in favor of joint efficiency. Another potential action would be to replace the service vice chiefs on the JROC with Combatant Command representatives, since they are in a better position to articulate requirements critical to joint operational execution.¹ A slower but equally necessary means lies in improving the quality and contact time of joint enculturation of service members earlier in their careers, even at the point of initial military training. Attitudinal and behavioral attachment could be positively impacted. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, authority with respect to mandating joint education requirements would have to be revised. Both instances would likely reencounter a high degree of resistance from all services.

¹ Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 77-78.

2. Broaden Efforts to Document Joint History

The services document service history, continually reinforcing a sense of the service as an imagined community and facilitating individual and unit identification with the larger idea of the service. The joint force possesses no systematic means of recording joint history, and as such, or reinforcing a sense of jointness. The focus of joint historical support needs to shift from the organizational history of OSD, OCS, and the CCMDs to the organizational history of the joint force and the record of jointness in the history of American arms. This action would improve attitudinal attachment and help create the sense of the DoD as a joint organization and is essential to the development of an imagined joint community. Such a “Joint Force” must evoke the same sense of pride and belonging among members as does “The Army”, “The Navy”, “The Marine Corps”, and “The Air Force”. Writing and making joint history accessible of itself is likely to experience little if any service resistance.

3. Revise the Joint Origin Myth

The current historical narrative of jointness is anchored on the wartime success of the JCS and joint operations in WWII. This is a weak origin myth, not the least because it must compete with service narratives that effectively leverage joint operations to emphasize individual service accomplishments and buttress service identity. Overly close identification with the physical manifestation of wartime jointness—the JCS—may actually encourage a limited focus on counterpart organizations today, namely the JCS, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Such focus may lead to exclusive emphasis on sub-organizational historical narratives at the

expense of an overall narrative that reinforces the sense of identity of the physical and imagined joint communities, as addressed in recommendation 2 above.

Rhetorical history should create an imagined joint community that permeates—and actually defines—American military endeavors, at least back to the American Revolution. A logical beginning point is the Battle of Yorktown. While a valuable case study of combined allied operations in which the United States is neither the dominant or most capable member, a point which may prove increasingly instructive as the nature of American alliances in the 21st Century changes, the battle also holds tremendous value as the basis for a joint narrative. In the climactic battle of the American Revolution, a battle that ultimately secured the existence of an independent American Republic, it was through—and *only through*—the success of joint land and naval operations (albeit French and American) that victory was achieved. Such a narrative would provide solid grounding for a joint origin myth.

4. Realign Historical Services

A realignment and repurposing of joint and service history offices would support recommendations 2 and 3 above. A “Joint Center of Military History”, for example, under which fall all like Service organizations/functions, conceivably would ensure a balanced historical narrative in which service and joint identity is equally reinforced. Behavioral attachment in historical services organizations at Center level would likely swing towards joint organizational identity. While vicious service resistance could be anticipated (not unlike that witnessed in the past, however), consolidation of service history functions at departmental level nevertheless might achieve cost efficiency in addition to leveling the playing field of historical narrative.

5. Institute a Single DoD Posture Hearing

This thesis has identified history and legal authorities as the strongest means of controlling military identity, once the Congress has determined overall military policy, manpower, and appropriations. The posture hearing process that occurs with the annual rollout of the President's budget provides opportunity for the service secretaries and chiefs to interface directly with their congressional advocates, reinforcing their individual efforts to achieve a competitive advantage in resource allocation. Streamlining the Congressional hearing process to require a single DoD department-level posture hearing would reinforce joint identity and increase effective joint influence relative to the services (and hopefully shorten the hearing process, which itself has become cumbersome). The Secretary of Defense and CJCS would represent both joint and service equities as head of an executive department. One risk of limiting formal service interaction with the defense committees might be the case of a White House unduly sensitive or that has crafted extremely narrow policy or budget flexibility, and committee members are deprived of a fuller contextual understanding of resulting military ramifications.

6. Revise Joint Officer Education Requirements

Goldwater-Nichols requirement for joint experience and joint education for officer promotion to flag officer is widely regarded as one of the law's most effective innovations.² Requiring proportional levels of joint education and experience for promotion from lieutenant colonel/commander to colonel/captain, while raising a firestorm of resistance within the services, would target the joint development of key officers—those destined to identify strategic agenda items and those who will decide on

² Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 15.

those items—at an earlier, more productive, point in their careers. In order to preserve the balance of joint and service competencies, promotion to colonel/captain should mandate key developmental *joint and service* experience and education. An aspiring lieutenant colonel/commander could expect at least two critical billets at this grade: one determined by his service, and the other defined by the CJCS.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The military establishment of the United States has been a work in progress since 1789. The Constitution—representing the collective will of the States upon its ratification—made sacrosanct the principle of civilian control over military forces, giving the Congress the authority for their organization and discipline while investing the authority for their employment in the President. The Congress provides the forces that the President commands. From the outset, efficiency in military organization was inextricably linked to military effectiveness. The Congress's natural tendency was to attempt to influence how military force would be employed; the President was predisposed to affecting the size and composition of military forces. The Constitutional separation of legislative and executive powers became a source of enduring friction in military matters—and a defining characteristic of how America prepares for war.

Central to the issue of military policy is the military itself. Once American regular armed forces were established, they quickly grew as institutions, acquiring organizational history, customs, traditions, conventions, experience—and an expert voice in discussions contemplating their organization and use. Uniformed officers now attempted to influence their civilian masters in military affairs, and this legislative-executive-military dynamic persists. While Washington was not the first to caution that the man who desires peace ought to be prepared for war, his heroic stature as the victorious commander of the Continental Army and as the Republic's first president ensured the consideration of his counsel. The Congress, President, and military services

all agreed on the necessity of being prepared for war, although each might differently define “prepared”—at least until hostilities erupted.

The Congress’s strongest control mechanism is the budget, historically realized through the imposition of military manpower limits and approval of military appropriations. There is a recurring seesaw effect, however, in which the Congress typically concedes to Executive requests for resources and authorities during actual or threatened conflict. While U.S. military operations usually have been deemed successful in their outcomes, American military forces seldom have been postured to best effect at the onset of hostilities. Part of the Congress’s motivation in reasserting its role in military policy determination following conflict is the belief that legislated change can improve the peacetime organizational efficiency of the armed forces such that their wartime effectiveness is similarly improved.

The period following WWII marks a fundamental change in the depth of legislated organization of the armed forces. Up to and during the war, once the Congress had determined the larger issues of policy, manpower, and appropriations, the Executive typically ruled in matters of internal military organization. The National Defense Act of 1947 replaced this dynamic with the National Military Establishment, renamed—and reorganized—as the Department of Defense in 1949. The Congress—but also the President and many uniformed officers—believed that some sort of fundamental organizational change was necessary in order to ensure the nation’s defense. WWII demonstrated that threats to peace now were larger in scale, faster in pace, more powerful in destructiveness—and that the key to military victory lay in integrating the capabilities of all military services into powerful joint operations.

The 1947 National Security Act sought to introduce joint organizational efficiency among military services that had grown in institutional stature in isolation from one another. Joint operating capability would guarantee that American forces would be “postured to best effect” when the next war started; legislation was necessary to overcome institutional resistance. While a significant milestone in the organizational development of the American military establishment, service resistance had the effect of preserving much of their statutory power with respect to the new Secretary of Defense. Almost 40 years would pass before Congressional passions were stirred to the extent that further and deep reaching legislation would be passed: the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986.

The provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation unquestionably contributed to increasing joint organizational efficiency in many aspects, but critics charge that the services have successfully resisted full compliance with the law’s intent. The recommendations this paper proposes are centered on the concept of military identity as a means of understanding the nature of service resistance, and seek to empower a Joint Force commensurate with the influence the services currently exercise with respect to determining joint organizational efficiency. Since service identity is the source of service institutional strength, the objective is to strengthen joint force identity by reinforcing a hybrid-organizational identity in which the individual service identities and collective joint identity coexist.

A sense of joint identity in equilibrium with service identities will improve the quality of U.S. military resource allocation, planning, and operational execution while preserving the innovativeness, perspectives, and unique capabilities of the services. But

the larger question addresses the feasibility of attaining and maintaining a strong joint identity, and whether only the achievement of joint effectiveness is sufficient. After half a century, the state of jointness in the American military has not fully realized the postwar intent for it. If the advantages of a strong joint identity are so compelling, then the attendant risks and costs associated with its development must be explored. If for example, joint identity becomes too dominant in a hybrid organization, the unique—and necessary—capabilities of the services could erode.

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